Social struggle, social contract and state of nature 27.05

The simplest narrative in our times, as Orr brings out in his text “Darwin and Darwinism: The (Alleged) Social implications of The Origin of Species”(2009), has been repeated endlessly: “the market … merely echoes the dictate of the nature” (Orr 2009: 768). Darwin’s ideas are seen as the precursor for the internal struggle of market, instead of seeing the market’s implications as something that moved onwards to Darwin’s theory.
Looking at the history of not just economical, but also political thought, it’s not hard to see how the idea of social struggle supports another set of ideas, that’s even older than Smith or Malthus: the discussion around the state of nature and what it means for human environments. One of the first theorists of social contract, Thomas Hobbes speculated in 17th century, how the equality of humans and scarce resources cause an eternal struggle: “During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather.” (Hobbes 1991[1651]: 87 ) - every man desires the same End, and therefore the first principal cause of quarrel is competition (Hobbes 1991: 88). This discussion of state of nature, whic of course leads to eternal war, justifies an authoritarian government which has the task of punishing its citizens enough for their violence so that state of nature can be evaded and humankind can progress. Hobbesian view is countered by Rousseau’s view of state of nature as something pure and non-violent (and essentially not struggle), where human civilization corrupts state of nature - and this is used as a different model of more democratic state.
Hobbes’s model eerily reminds us of spencerian competition as described by Orr: “competition in human society may be ruthless but it is natural, inevitable—and defensible scientifically” (Orr 2009: 768) or how Claeys sums up Malthusian influence on social darwinism: “mankind being governed by natural laws shared by animals, in a world in which scarce resources were acquired through greater mental and physical effort”(Claeys 2000: 235). Both of those influences lead us to a view of endless conflict determining outcomes - but while a Hobbesian sees it as a force that needs to be tamed, then 19th century philosopher doesn’t want to tame this struggle – instead it seems smarter to profit off of it (and profiteers, probably, will get the badge of “fittest”)? But this is a detour already - profit and fitness is another topic for another essay. The same hobbesian spirit is carried into Malthus (whom Claeys describes as a precursor for social darwinism). “ Were there no established administration of property, every man would be obliged to guard with force his little store. Selfishness would be triumphant. The subjects of contention would be perpetual. Every individual mind would be under a constant anxiety about corporal support, and not a single intellect would be left free to expatiate in the field of thought.“ (Malthus 1959: 63). Here Malthus is criticizing Godwin’s (anarchist) ideas of equal societies brought forth by ample resources and less administration of property. Malthus argues that having enough resources is an impossibility (because population always grows more than resources), echoing precisely Hobbes’s description how a society acts when there’s less resources than necessary.
But how would we describe social darwinism? Was the main idea behind it just the social struggle and concept of some racial and intellectual fitness as Claeys(2000) concludes? Halliday describes in “What is social darwinism”(1970) as a problem with social darwinism that its definitions span from something generally linked to eugenics and “race-hygiene” to cynical discussion about predilection of aggression (Halliday 1971: 389). As a positive project, Halliday (1971: 393-395) sketches three “families” of thought that social darwinism loosely relates to. First, mankind as a special “rational” species - which brings forth the moral growth and social liberal structures. Second, explaining man as a genetic or hereditarian, rather than rational construct. Man is unique because of adaptation, and this brings forth simple political doctrines: limiting the “unfit”, dismantle welfare – a view that is classically called social darwinism. Third, instead of talking innate or internal properties, man is described as an actor upon world, maker – probably the term “anthropocene” would have rather fit to describe Halliday’s description here. From this view stems civics: urban planning and social geography, focussing on unity, not particulars.
Halliday asks why should we equal eugenics and social darwinism: both of them deal with dispensing the “unfit” - and ”socialist” society would run against the idea of boosting “fitness”: “Socialism, then, was equated with the fact of a differential birth rate favouring the survival of the unfit, rather than with collectivism” (Halliday 1971: 399). Eugenics is not a problematic interpretation of social darwinism, but rather the eugenicists were “true Darwinians in assimilating the biological problem of survival to the social problem of reproduction” (Halliday 1971: 400). Claeys diverges here much more specifically: instead of equating eugenics and social darwinism, he sees its newness in establishing intelligence as fitness - and correlating intelligence with whiteness (Claeys 2000: 240). In terms of whiteness, this seeems to be really new, but when it comes to weapons of struggle, the discussion seems to be older than social darwinism. Let’s return to Hobbes, and his human’s nasty, short and brutish life. One of the greatest equalizers in Hobbes’s humans is not just strength: some men might be weaker, some stronger physically, but “. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.“ (Hobbes 1991: 87).
So there’s not just struggle in Hobbes, but also the feat of intelligence or cooperation - although cooperation is not some altruistic trait, but another form of gaining strength in some sort of competition. Malthus(1959) seems quite inspired by this idea, and builds on it while describing some fictional tribes fighting each other (noting himself that there aren’t many records of it, so we can assume it’s his figment of imagination once again talking about state of nature here), because shepherding does not sustain enough food for the growing population, young men are sent away and they fight with each other: “And when they fell in with any tribes like their own, the contest was a struggle for existence, and they fought with a desperate courage, inspired by the reflection that death was the punishment of defeat and life the prize of victory.“ (Malthus 1959: 17). The argumentation from Hobbes to Malthus doesn’t change much: there is none but an assumption of human nature - or a state of nature where scarce resources breed eternally warring and violent factions out of which one dies and one survives. Quite different state from not just Rousseau, but also Locke, who based his state of nature discussion more on sensible arrangements around property (and which were often also based on assumption that there are enought resources if people work on them enough).
But how do we get from the theories of state of nature to the theories of struggle? There is, as much as we have lined out, much differing: social darwinism is more detailed in its scientific racism and division of intelligence and non-intelligence - dividing civilizations by race, instead of their forms of communication or current political state is new. At the same time, they both share some unattainable description of “humans at their original state of nature” thesis: a construction of noble savage, or ignoble savage without culture, without restrictions or without ethics. And this savage is used just to show how we have progressed, evolutionized, changed - the farther we are from this fictional form, the better off. Hobbes proposed authoritarian government, social darwinism proposed almost eugenics.